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ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRUCTION: 
A SHELBY COUNTY CASE STUDY 
KAIYA M. A. ARROYO 
The “construction zone” is ineliminable:  the actual text of the U.S. 
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require 
constitutional construction for their application to concrete constitutional 
cases. 
- Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction. 
INTRODUCTION 
No comparison or discussion of constitutional interpretation theories is 
complete without mentioning originalism.  Regardless of personal feelings 
about the theory’s efficacy as a valid conception of constitutional interpre-
tation, it is now beyond dispute that the doctrine has ascended as one of the 
primary methods of constitutional adjudication.  This is hardly surprising.  
While there are many groups of thought as to what originalism “really 
does,” its core tenets–-(1) the notion of fidelity to the Constitution1 and (2) 
the desire to curb judicial activism2–-appeal to the most intimate democrat-
ic American sentiments.  The Constitution represents both an original con-
sensus of law by the people and a supermajority of that consent.  In con-
trast, judicial policymaking by unelected officials is often viewed as an 
affront to democratic governance.  It harkens back to feelings of pre-
American colonialism where British magistrates and other foreign leaders 
imposed their will upon the majority.  From this backdrop, originalism fits 
nicely within the traditional notion of American democracy.3 
 
 1 Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Virtue of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, and Nerve, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1249, 1250 (1997) (discussing judicial fidelity to the constitution in the con-
text of different interpretive philosophies). 
 2 Edwin Meese, Speech Before the American Bar Association (Jul. 9, 1985) (explaining that dis-
covering the original intention of the Framers is required to curb judicial activism). 
 3 Indeed, this sentiment is one going back centuries.  In this paper, I will discuss the original public 
meaning of enforcing provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment through “appropriate legislation.”  
When legislation for the enforcement of the Reconstruction Amendments was being considered, 
the representatives declared this sentiment as the bedrock of the nation, and used that rhetoric to 
buttress their understandings of what legislation would be “appropriate.”  For example, Repre-
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It is unclear, however, whether the originalism theory, in practice, 
serves as the proper conduit to execute these ideas.  Often, we see Supreme 
Court opinions where the majority and dissent offer opposing outcomes 
that are still arguably in line with an originalist approach.4  If the original 
meaning of the text is the law, how can this be? 
The answer to this question may be rooted in the way that judges make 
decisions in practice.  Georgetown Law Professor Lawrence Solum5 pro-
vides a theory of constitutional interpretation in which constitutional deci-
sion-making is ubiquitously broken into two parts:  constitutional interpre-
tation and constitutional construction.6  Constitutional interpretation is the 
process by which judges determine the communicative and linguistic con-
tent of the text, while constitutional construction is the process by which 
judges take that content to construct a rule or holding.  Although a judge is 
constrained by the original interpretation, the construction step requires a 
judge to use methods of interpretation beyond a discovery of the text’s 
original linguistic meaning. 
Herein lies the problem:  if originalism concerns the determination of 
the communicative and linguistic content of the text, then a discovery of 
the original public meaning of a text is not sufficient to create a rule or 
holding, and the initial allure of the theory as one that constrains judges and 
keeps fidelity to the law is unfounded.  Judges will still be required to use 
normative methods of constitutional construction to determine what the law 
is.7 
Unsurprisingly, many originalist adherents disagree that constitutional 
interpretation is bifurcated into interpretation and construction.  Indeed, in 
 
sentative James Leach (D) of North Carolina began his soliloquy against House Bill 320 with 
this speech: 
Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States, when observed in all its provisions 
and administered in its integrity, is worth more to a great nation, infinitely more, than all 
the political parties and politicians in the world. . . . [T]he Constitution, framed as it was 
for all time . . . was based upon principles so just and grand, so sacred and ever-living in 
their character and object, as to render them indissoluble and perpetual, as they were in-
tended to be by their illustrious founders. 
Leach of North Carolina, Globe, 42nd Cong.,1st sess., Appendix, p. 478. 
 4 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down the Voting Rights Act 
§4(b) as unconstitutional); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) 
(striking down a gun restriction in Washington, D.C.). 
 5 Professor Lawrence Solum is a legal theorist and the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law at 
Georgetown University.  He has written extensively on the issue of constitutional interpretation 
and is known for the constitutional construction argument that will be expounded upon in this 
paper. 
 6 Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. R. 453, 453 
(2014). 
 7 For the purposes of this paper, the term “normative methods of constitutional construction” de-
scribes whichever method of construction that a judge elects to use when constructing a rule or 
holding.  As Professor Solum states, these methods of statutory construction are selected by each 
judge. 
Apr. 2016] ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 3 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia rejects Professor Solum’s construction zone theory by arguing that 
any post-interpretation rulemaking is severely constrained by the text’s 
original public meaning and can be further constrained through a method of 
textual interpretation called the Fair Reading Method.8  This method in-
vokes a combination of textual and interpretive canons in an attempt to 
cabin judicial discretion. 
However, textualism and originalism are distinct theories of interpreta-
tion.  This comment argues for the ubiquity of the construction zone when 
dealing with litigated constitutional questions.  Justice Scalia’s Fair Read-
ing Method, while possibly a good method of construction, is merely an-
other normative method of constitutional construction that is not actually a 
part of originalism as a theory.  The existence of the interpreta-
tion/construction distinction is admitted once it is recognized that more 
work must be done to get a rule or holding after the discovery of the origi-
nal meaning of the text. 
Shelby County v. Holder, a 2013 Supreme Court decision, provides an 
interesting case study to explore the manner in which constitutional con-
struction can lead to divergent understandings about what the law actually 
is.  Shelby County,  which invalidated  § 4b  of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, which set the criteria for state who would be required to obtain pre-
clearance from the federal government before implementing changes to 
their voting procedures.  Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, deter-
mined that the Voting Rights Act unconstitutionally infringed upon state 
equal sovereignty, while Justice Ginsburg’s dissent argued that the Fif-
teenth Amendment’s Appropriate Legislation Clause abrogated that sover-
eignty.  Both Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg come to reasonable, op-
posing positions that the original understanding of “appropriate legislation” 
can be interpreted to both compel and deny abrogation. 
Assuming that neither justice would ignore the validity of a constitu-
tional amendment, such opposing decisions can only result if the interpreta-
tion of the Appropriate Legislation Clause produced a vague, loosely con-
strained understanding of the law that required further normative 
constitutional construction.9  This comment explores this idea by walking 
through the constitutional interpretation theory, as explained by Professor 
Solum, with the Appropriate Legislation Clause.  If the original public 
meaning can produce a constraining principle without further normative 
construction, then Justice Scalia’s rejection of the theory is well-founded.  
 
 8 Antonin Scalia and Bryan Garner, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 8 
(2012). 
 9 For a discussion of the problem with normative constitutional construction, see footnote 7, supra, 
and accompanying text.  See also footnote 15-16, infra, and accompanying text. 
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If not, perhaps this case provides an example of a large flaw with original-
ism as a theory. 
Section I will explain Professor Solum’s constitutional interpretation 
theory as a two-step process and the major criticisms of that theory–-
namely, the rejection of the construction zone or the belief that the con-
straint principle provides a sufficient safeguard against judicial overreach.  
Section I will also explain the Shelby County v. Holder decision and how it 
serves as a good case study for the construction theory.  Section II will pro-
vide a background of the Voting Rights Act and § 4(b) of the Act.  Section 
III(a) will walk through the constitutional interpretation step with the Ap-
propriate Legislation Clause to determine if a constraining principle can be 
found.  Finally, Section III(b) will analyze whether originalism delivers on 
its two main tenets. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING ORIGINALISM AS A TWO-STEP PROCESS 
A.  Understanding Constitutional Interpretation and Construction 
Professor Solum’s article, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 
advances a theory of constitutional interpretation that distinguishes be-
tween the actual interpretation of constitutional text and the construction of 
the text to determine its legal effect.10  Constitutional interpretation, in Pro-
fessor Solum’s view, is “the activity that discovers the communicative con-
tent or linguistic meaning of the constitutional text,”11 while constitutional 
construction “is the activity that determines the legal effect given the text, 
including doctrines of constitutional law and decisions of constitutional 
cases or issues by judges and other officials.”12 
Constitutional interpretation is both the preliminary step in all judicial 
decisions and is governed by the core principles of originalism:  fixation 
and constraint.13  Solum agrees with a majority of his peers that the linguis-
tic meaning of the text is unchanging and is determined at the time of its 
framing and ratification.  He also asserts that, once the original understand-
ing of the word or phrase has been determined, that understanding must 
constrain the constitutional construction of the final legal rule.14 
Constitutional construction, by contrast, is the normative process con-
ducted by judges once a judge has discovered the constraints of the text’s 
original understanding through interpretation.15  These theories need not 
 
 10 See Solum, supra note 6 at 453. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 459. 
 14 Id. at 460. 
 15 See Lawrence Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. R. 453, 
474-75 (2014). 
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connect with originalism in any significant way other an initial adherence 
to the constraints discovered in the interpretation process.  Regardless of 
the normative philosophy for construction that was used to reach a deci-
sion, a particular case is appropriately decided as long as the original un-
derstanding of the text does not conflict with the decision reached by the 
judge.16 
While Professor Solum’s article attempts to resolve some tensions be-
tween originalism and its critics, it in fact exposes the theory to two glaring 
flaws.  Originalism is championed as a bulwark against judicial overreach 
and traces its own origins to the works of advocates such as Robert Bork,17 
William Rehnquist,18 and Edwin Meese.19  Its supporters advocate for 
originalism because they believe that finding the original public meaning of 
the text ensures that judicial decisions remain faithful to the law.  If Profes-
sor Solum is correct, however, originalism can neither (1) force judicial re-
straint nor (2) truly maintain fidelity to the law. 
If the original meaning of the text is only the first step in the process of 
developing a rule, then only constraints discovered during interpretation 
can impede or assist judges in their duties.  To be sure, constitutional con-
struction requires understanding the terms that were given to us by the 
Framers and allowing that understanding to require certain holdings and 
militate against others.  However, if the plain meaning of the text is irre-
ducibly vague, understanding the original public meaning will bring judges 
only nominally closer to reaching a decision in a particular case. 
If the existence of the construction zone neither restrains judges nor ful-
ly leads them to create rules that are faithful to what the law really is, then 
for many constitutional questions, the general premises upon which the 
theory is purported to be the superior method of constitutional interpreta-
tion may be unfounded.  This is true if construction happens in every con-
stitutional judicial decision.20  While there is clear, unambiguous language 
 
 16 When describing the construction zone, Professor Solum stipulates that constitutional construc-
tion is “essentially driven by normative concerns.”  He then explains his theory using two “toy” 
philosophies of construction–-constitutional Thayerianism and the Moral Readings Theory.  Both 
theories reach disparate results based on their normative values of decision making, and both are 
seen as acceptable in the construction phase.  See Solum, supra note 6 at 472-73. 
 17 Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8 
(1971) (discussing the importance of judicial adherence to the text and the history, and their fair 
implications) . 
 18 William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 693, 696-697 
(1976). 
 19 Edwin Meese III, Speech Before the American Bar Association, July 9, 1985, in ORIGINALISM:  
A QUARTER-CENTURY OF DEBATE 47, 47-48 (STEVEN G. CALABRESI, ED., 2007). 
 20 See Solum, supra note 6 at 495-500 (arguing that the construction zone is ubiquitous in judicial 
decision making).  While there are many constitutional clauses that are unambiguous, much of 
the Constitution’s language is filled with terms that create ambiguity.  This ambiguity will be 
discussed further below in notes 19-28, infra. 
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in much of the constitution that results in a strict constructionist application 
of the text, those situations are far less likely to be litigated. 
Take, for example, the constitutional provision that “neither shall any 
Person be eligible to [the President’s] Office who shall not have attained to 
the Age of thirty five Years.”21 If, in the next presidential cycle, a 32-year-
old candidate attempts to run, the original meaning of the text will fully 
constrain any rule that a judge may create.  The language is clear enough to 
leave no room for construction.  Similarly, the Constitution also states that 
“[t]he Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from 
each State.”22 If any cases arise in which three Senators are elected in Mas-
sachusetts, the construction zone is again entirely diminished, as the origi-
nal meaning provides a clear interpretation of what the law should mean 
and precludes any further judicial interpretation. 
In these scenarios, the construction of the statute’s text into a workable 
rule allows for nothing else.  However, these cases are at the core of the 
text’s determinate meaning.  This also means that the likelihood that these 
cases would go to trial at all, much less make it to the Supreme Court, is 
almost nonexistent.23  Most litigated constitutional provisions do not fall 
into this category.  Consider, for example, the wealth of case law surround-
ing the First Amendment’s prohibition on “abridging the freedom of 
speech”24 or the Fourth Amendment’s language discussing “unreasonable 
search and seizure.”25 The key distinction between these examples and the 
examples above are that the highly litigated text contains “vague” lan-
guage, or language that is not clearly defined.26 
Even Professor Solum recognizes that often, the construction of consti-
tutional text is too “vague or irreducibly ambiguous” to provide determi-
nate answers to constitutional questions, and so judges are necessarily re-
 
 21 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1, cl. 5. 
 22 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 23 Frederick Schauer, Rules In Law and Elsewhere, in THINKING LIKE A LAWYER, 13, 32-37, 152-
53 (2009) (discussing the concept of “core” versus “penumbral” cases). 
 24 U.S. CONST., amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.”). 
 25 U.S. CONST., amend. IV. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 26 See Vague Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY.COM http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/vague (defining what vague can mean). See also Solum, supra note 6, at 
470 (describing the possible meaning of “vague”).  “Vague” language can often result in penum-
bral or borderline cases in which it is unclear whether certain acts or objects fall within the de-
fined term provided by the drafters.  This also leads to an increase in litigation surrounding these 
particular amendments and phrases.  See Schauer, supra note 23, at 136 (examining how ambig-
ious language can be interpreted). 
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quired to construct an applicable holding or legal doctrine from tools be-
yond the actual plain meaning of the text.27  At this point, the two great ra-
tionalizations for originalism – textual fidelity and judicial restraint – be-
come nullified. Solem concedes that while constitutional interpretation is 
highly fact-driven, constitutional construction is “essentially driven by 
normative concerns.”28 What’s more, he admits: 
“[S]ome theories of constitutional construction may be driven by consideration 
of political morality, whereas other theories may look to norms that are internal 
to legal practice. The abstract fact that construction is essentially normative 
does not entail any particular account of the norms that ought to govern the 
practice of construction.29 
Of course, many originalists believe that the construction zone, if it ex-
ists at all, is relatively minor. They argue that by implementing the terms of 
art or original methods that the Framers used at the time of ratification, 
judges can make precise determinations of vague terms.30 Others argue that 
the creation of constitutional default rules diminishes the construction 
zone,31 and some call for deference to the political branches in situations of 
uncertainty.32 However, these theories conflate originalism with other dis-
tinct methods of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
The most highly debated and problematic decisions often require inter-
pretation and construction of irreducibly vague constitutional texts.  In 
these cases, the construction zone gives judges the freedom to select any 
one of several theories of construction which could each lead to a different 
outcome in a given case.  Indeed, in Professor Solum’s explanation of the 
normative nature of the construction zone, two opposite theories of inter-
pretation are utilized.  Each begins with a search of the original communi-
cative context and ultimately reaches opposite results.33 If originalism can 
take judges only halfway to an answer and ultimately leaves the interpre-
tive method to the individual judge, then the theory neither explicates the 
law nor cabins judicial discretion.  In this light, the theory ultimately be-
 
 27 See Solum, supra note 6, at 519 (recognizing the ambiguity of the language of the Constitution). 
 28 See Solum, supra note 6, at 472 (noting that Constitutional interpretation is driven by normative 
concerns). 
 29 See id. (emphasis added) (noting that the political morality plays into Constitutional interpreta-
tion).  Essentially, this statement concedes that originalism places no other conditions on norma-
tive methods besides fixation and constraint, which allows the judge to select a method that could 
be best suited to his or her own ideals. 
 30 John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalist: A New Theory of 
Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 (2009). 
 31 See Gary Lawson, Dead Document Walking, 92 B.C.L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2012) (outlining his 
argument regarding the construction zone). 
 32 See Solum, supra note 6 at 514-520 (discussing Michael Paulsen’s argument that a version of 
Thayeriansim can shrink, but not destroy, the construction zone). The three main arguments as-
serted here are beyond the scope of this paper. For an explanation and rebuttal of these positions, 
see id. at 503-520 (examining Thayeriansim and the construction zone). 
 33 See id. at 472-73 (describing the role of normativity in the construction zone). 
8 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 18: 
comes unhelpful, at least in the constitutional context where so many 
clauses contain irreducibly ambiguous and vague language. 
B.  Challenging the Ubiquity of the Construction Zone 
Unsurprisingly, many scholars have an alternate view of originalism 
and its role in constitutional interpretation.  In his book, Reading Law: The 
Interpretation of Legal Texts, Justice Scalia and his co-author, Bryan Gar-
ner, champion originalism as a way to provide a “generally agreed-on ap-
proach to the interpretation of legal texts.”34 The authors declare original-
ism to be “the soundest, most principled one that exists”35 as it “instructs 
interpreters to ‘look for meaning in the governing text, ascribe to that text 
the meaning that is has borne from its inception, and reject judicial specula-
tion about both the drafters’ extra-textually derived purposes and the desir-
ability of the fair reading’s anticipated consequences.”36 In short, Justice 
Scalia champions originalism for the virtues that the construction principle 
calls into question. 
Consequently, the late Justice Scalia had no patience for the construc-
tion zone theory.  In his book, he dismisses the theory as illegitimate, 
claiming that the distinction is irrelevant and has never been used among 
actual practitioners.37 However, it is unclear whether Justice Scalia’s views 
on legal decision-making greatly differ in practice. In Reading Law’s intro-
duction, Justice Scalia describes his philosophy of interpretation and cham-
pions textualism as the proper method of construction.38 Throughout his 
explanation, it becomes clear that the justice’s views on construction fit 
squarely within the interpretation/construction distinction. 
His explanation begins by stating that “exclusive reliance on the 
text….elicits both better drafting and decision-making.”39  It is also well 
documented that for Justice Scalia, any textual investigation is defined by 
its probing inquiry into the original public meaning of that text while re-
jecting extra-textual intents and purposes.40  This understanding perfectly 
aligns with the interpretation step as described by Professor Solum.  Both 
authors agree that the first step in the judicial decision-making process is to 
 
 34 Scalia, supra note 8 at xxvii. 
 35 See id. (describing the need for a unifying way of interpretating the law). 
 36 Mitchell Berman, Judge Posner’s Simple Law, 113 Mich. L. Rev. 777, 782 (2015). 
 37 See Scalia, supra note 8 at 14-15 (discussing the falseness of the distinction between interpreta-
tion and construction). 
 38 See id. at 15-36 (advancing a textual approach to legal interpretation and describing a general 
overview of the theory in practice). 
 39 See id. at 16. 
 40 See Berman, supra note 36at 782-83; see also Scalia, supra note 8, at 15-17 (describing textual-
ism), and ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 
(1997) at 27. 
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look to the text for its original meaning and constrain any decision to that 
understanding.41 
However, Reading Law also discusses the concept of “permissible 
meanings.”42  It recognizes that words can be both ambiguous – having two 
or more meanings – and vague – having an uncertain application to an un-
questioned meaning.43  While Reading Law argues that this concept is not 
distinct from constitutional interpretation, it admits that there are occasions 
when the original understanding of the text’s communicative content has 
taken the judge as far as it can.  This admission is fatal to a denial of the 
construction zone. 
This definition of vagueness is precisely what Professor Solum argues 
creates the construction zone.44  By admitting that vagueness exists, Justice 
Scalia acknowledged that something more than mere interpretation of a 
text’s communicative content is required.  In fact, when describing the Fair 
Reading Method, which the Justice determined to be the best method for 
staying true to the true textual understanding,45  He incorporated the “per-
missible meanings” concept, which grants that certain words and phrases in 
a statute can be reasonably read to mean more than one thing.  The method 
aids judges in choosing between these permissible meanings. 
While Justice Scalia placed this method within the interpretation step, 
constitutional interpretation is the process of understanding the original 
public meaning of the words themselves.  In contrast, construction is the 
process by which that meaning is transformed into a rule.  The original 
meaning of the text can be discovered and the language can still be ambig-
uous or vague—have more than one permissible meaning.  The construc-
tion zone is where judges take the understood original public meaning and 
determine the words’ application through other means of statutory con-
struction. 
Essentially, the Fair Reading Method is a strictly textual constructional 
approach to determining the law.  However, this is merely another norma-
tive method of construction.  Once Justice Scalia conceded that the text’s 
communicative content provides more than one permissible meaning, he 
moved beyond constitutional interpretation and into the construction zone.  
What’s more, by recognizing that vague language is a recurring phenome-
non which necessitates further construction, the justice added credence to 
the assertion that construction is present in most litigated cases. 
 
 41 See text accompanying notes 14-16, supra; see also, Scalia, supra note 8, at 31 (“A fundamental 
rule of textual interpretation is that neither a word nor a sentence may be given a meaning that it 
cannot bear.”) 
 42 See Scalia, supra note 33, at 31. 
 43 See id. at 32; see also note 26 supra and the discussion of vague terms in the accompanying text. 
 44 See Solum, supra note 6, at 469-70. 
 45 See Scalia, supra note 8, at 33. 
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C.   Shelby County v. Holder – A Case Study 
Shelby County v. Holder, which overturned portions of the Voting 
Rights Act as unconstitutional, provides an interesting practical example of 
the construction/interpretation distinction.  In the opinion, the majority and 
dissent base their holdings on interpretations of the Tenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments.  The majority held that portions of the Voting Rights Act 
impermissibly abrogated state equal sovereignty under the Tenth Amend-
ment,46 while the dissent argued that the original public understanding of 
the Fifteenth Amendment’s “appropriate legislation” provision empowered 
Congress to do so.47 
In his majority opinion, Justice Roberts pays short shrift to Justice 
Ginsburg’s “appropriate legislation” argument, dismissing it as less press-
ing than Tenth Amendment concerns of state equal sovereignty.48  Howev-
er, the opinion was unclear about why state equal sovereignty is more im-
portant than the Fifteenth Amendment’s grant to Congress.  Article V of 
the Constitution describes the amendment process by which a previous por-
tion of the Constitution can be superseded.49  When an Amendment is 
passed, the new Amendment supersedes the original language inasmuch as 
that language conflicts with the original text.  If the Fifteenth Amendment’s 
“appropriate legislation” language conflicted with the idea of state equal 
sovereignty, the Tenth Amendment would seem to be abrogated to the ex-
tent that there was a conflict. 
While Justice Roberts’ actual reasoning and justifications are unknowa-
ble, general knowledge of the amendment process would imply that the 
chief justice did not merely ignore the Appropriate Legislation Clause, but 
rather had a different understanding of its meaning and application.  Ac-
cordingly, this situation creates a perfect hypothetical to test the interpreta-
tion/construction distinction theory. 
Shelby County highlights the ease with which two judges can stay faith-
ful to the original public meaning of constitutional text and reach opposing 
decisions regarding whether a statute comports with the Constitution.  The 
remainder of this comment investigates the original understanding of the 
Appropriate Legislation Clause to determine if reliance upon the natural 
and reasonable meaning of that clause can provide a constraining principle 
to the question in Shelby County.  If such a principle cannot be found, the 
determination of a rational method to choose between options would neces-
 
 46 See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2623-24 (2013). 
 47 See id. at 2648-50 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
 48 State equal sovereignty is the idea that all states have a right to be as equally free from federal 
interference as other states.  In Shelby County, Alabama qualified under Section 4(b) and argued 
that the legislation subjected them to federal preclearance for voting changes while other states 
were not, thereby making the states who did qualify less sovereign than their counterparts. 
 49 U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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sarily be a normative method of construction, and perhaps give credence to 
the idea of a ubiquitous construction zone. 
II.  THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE APPROPRIATE 
LEGISLATION CLAUSE 
Fifty years ago, Congress passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which 
has since played an instrumental role in securing the minority franchise in 
America.50  One of the driving forces behind the Act’s potency is Section 5, 
which declares that before enacting any change in a voting “qualification, 
standard, practice, or procedure:” 
any State or political subdivision with respect to the prohibitions set forth in 
section 4(a)…may institute an action…for declaratory judgment that such qual-
ification… does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or 
abridging the right to vote on account of race or color, and unless . . . the court 
enters such judgment[,] no person shall be denied the right to vote for failure to 
comply with such qualification…or procedure.51 
States subject to preclearance are defined in Section 4(b) as jurisdic-
tions that (1) maintained “any test or device” designed to abrogate the mi-
nority vote, and (2) in 1964, had less than half of eligible voters participate 
in the year preceding the Act’s passage.52  The original requirements set in 
place under Section 4 were set to expire after five years.53  However, Con-
gress continually returned to the issue of voting rights throughout the inter-
vening decades and investigations before the Act’s reauthorization in 1970, 
1975, 1982, and 2006 led Congress to determine that voter discrimination 
continued to be a pervasive evil in society.54 
Three years ago, Shelby County v. Holder struck down § 4(b) of the 
Voting Rights Act as an unconstitutional infringement upon state equal 
sovereignty.  The 5-4 decision featured Chief Justice Roberts’ majority 
opinion, which held that the Act’s requirement that some, but not all,  states 
would be subjected to preclearance was unconstitutional under the Tenth 
Amendment, and Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which championed the Act as 
both a necessary and constitutional buttress against minority voter suppres-
sion under the Fifteenth Amendment’s Appropriate Legislation Clause. 
 
 50 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628. 
 51 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 5 (2012). 
 52 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 4(b) (2012). 
 53 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 438 § 4(a) (2012). 
 54 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2620-21 (2013), and id. at 2635-36, 2640-43 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
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III.  INTERPRETING AND CONSTRUCTING SHELBY COUNTY V. 
HOLDER 
As previously discussed, some scholars objecto to the ubiquity of the 
construction zone, claiming  that it either (1) does not exist, or (2) is suffi-
ciently governed by fixation and constraint to alleviate concerns of judicial 
overreach or deviation from the law’s true meaning.  This section endeav-
ors to discover the communicative content of the Appropriate Legislation 
Clause to determine if such a constraining framework exists.  It looks to the 
semantic and contextual understanding of the word “appropriate” at the 
time the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified, the definitional understanding 
of the word, its usage at the time, and its meaning in context with the Re-
construction Amendments and the Constitution as a whole.  It also looks to 
contemporary enforcement legislation and the original understanding of the 
Framers. 
A.  Constitutional Interpretation 
The search for a constraining principle begins with the “interpretation” 
step, as defined by Professor Solum.  Following the interpreta-
tion/construction distinction, a judge’s initial responsibility when determin-
ing whether the Fifteenth Amendment abrogated the idea of state equal 
sovereignty is to find the communicative content of the words “appropriate 
legislation” by looking at both the semantic and contextual understanding 
of the phrase55 using linguistic facts, history, and original intent to aid in 
that determination.56 
The language of the Fifteenth Amendment states that: 
SECTION 1: [t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
SECTION 2: The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.57 
No definition of “appropriate legislation” is contained in the above text, 
which has often been explained as the drafters’ intent for the meaning of 
the phrase to be determined by Congress.58  This omission immediately tel-
egraphs that the “original public meaning” of “appropriate legislation” is 
likely to ultimately fall within both Justice Scalia and Professor Solum’s 
 
 55 See Solum, supra note 6, at 459. 
 56 See id. at 481, Fig. 3. 
 57 U.S. Const., amend. XV, §§ 1-2. [emphasis added]. 
 58 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3D SESS., app., p. 163 (1869) (statement of Sen. Willard 
Saulsbury).  In relevant part, Mr. Saulsbury states that  “appropriate legislation” is “a word not 
defined in the instrument, but leaving its legitimate and proper meaning to be determined by each 
particular head in this Senate Chamber and in the House of Representatives . . . .” 
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understanding of “irreducibly vague.”59 Such a conclusion, however, would 
be premature at this stage.  First, a judge would need to look to other 
sources for the semantic and contextual meaning of the phrase. 
1.  Semantic Content of “Appropriate Legislation” 
The semantic meaning can be found by looking to contemporary dic-
tionaries at the time of framing and by looking at the syntax of the phrase 
or group of phrases surrounding it.60  Technically, the entire phrase “The 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion” could be subject to scrutiny.  However, as there was no tension in the 
Shelby County decision regarding the actual meaning of most of the sen-
tence, focus should be placed on the word “appropriate,” Where the tension 
between the majority and dissenting opinions lies. 
The word “appropriate” can be used as either a verb or an adjective.  
The word’s positioning in Section 2, however, is being used to modify the 
word “legislation,” describing the type of legislation that Congress can use 
as a vehicle to enforce the provisions of Section 1.  Words that are used to 
describe the surrounding nouns, as opposed to defining the action or state 
of being of the noun, are adjectives.61  Thus, in this context, “appropriate” 
is being employed as an adjective. 
There were at least two main American dictionaries in circulation at the 
time of ratification.  The most prominent dictionary in circulation contem-
poraneously with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment was The Ameri-
can Dictionary of the English Language Second Edition,62 which in later 
editions would come to be known as Webster’s Dictionary.  The American 
Dictionary defines the adjective “appropriate” as follows: 
1. Belonging peculiarly; peculiar; set apart for a particular use or person; as, re-
ligious worship is an appropriate duty to the Creator. 
2. Most suitable, fit or proper; as, to use appropriate words in pleading.63 
The Dictionary of English Language, published in 1860, offers a simi-
lar definition:  “consigned to some particular person or use; peculiar; fit; 
adapted; suitable.”64  From these definitions, we can determine that “appro-
 
 59 See Scalia, supra note 8, at 15; see also Solum, supra note 6, at 458. 
 60 See Solum, supra note 6-12 and accompanying text; see also Solum, supra note 6 at 459. 
 61 Adjective, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/adjective; see 
also, Verb, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verb. 
 62 Noah Webster, THE AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, (2d ed. 1828), availa-
ble at http://1828.mshaffer.com/d/word/appropriate. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Joseph A. Worchester, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE 72 (Hickling, Swan, and 
Brewer, eds. 1860), available at 
https://ia600409.us.archive.org/14/items/cu31924027443393/cu31924027443393.pdf. 
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priate legislation” either means “very particular or specific types of legisla-
tion,” or “through the most suitable or proper legislation.” 
Only one understanding seems correct in the context of the entire Con-
stitution.  The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments each contain an 
identical section in their texts.  These amendments were ratified in 1865 
and 1868, respectively.  Subsequent legislation passed as a direct result of 
these amendments were not of a particular or specific type, other than the 
fact that they related to the subject matter of their respective amendments.  
Moreover, if “appropriate” were used as “particular” in this framework to 
mean “related to the subject-matter of the Amendment,” it would nullify 
the significance of the word.  All federal laws must be grounded in a Con-
stitutional power, and so any law based on a particular amendment would 
necessarily be related to the subject matter. 
It appears, then, that when Congress and the States ratified that “[t]he 
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion,” it granted Congress the power to enact “the most suitable, fit or prop-
er” legislation.  Of course, this new definition begs the question:  “what is 
the most suitable, fit, or proper legislation?”  This definition seems just as, 
if not more, vague than the initial word “appropriate,” as it simply adds 
more indeterminate words. 
2.  Contextual Enrichment of “Appropriate Legislation” 
The initial inquiry into the semantic meaning of “appropriate” legisla-
tion seems to have yielded no definitive result.  However, a word or phrase 
that continues to be ambiguous or vague after a semantic investigation is 
not yet necessarily “irreducibly ambiguous or vague.”  Constitutional inter-
pretation allows for an investigation into the context in which a word or 
phrase was written.65  As discussed above, this is done by looking into both 
the history and original intent of the drafters.66  Therefore,  investigation 
into the contextual content of Section 2 is required. 
a.  Constitutional Context 
When looking at the context of a word or phrase, the inquiry should 
begin with the surrounding text.  Both the explicit language of the Constitu-
tion and precedent surrounding the understanding of “appropriate legisla-
tion” at the time of the Fifteenth Amendment’s drafting could provide in-
sight into the contemporary public meaning of the provision.  At the time 
of framing, the phrase “appropriate legislation” had been used in only two 
other constitutional clauses:  the enforcement sections of the Thirteenth and 
 
 65 See Solum, supra note 6 at 481, Fig. 3. 
 66 Id. 
Apr. 2016] ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 15 
Fourteenth Amendments.  Additionally, in Shelby County, Justice Ginsburg 
provides a strong argument that the understanding of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause enabled Congress to enact legislation like section 4(b), 
which can be corroborated by statements from contemporary legislators. 
When the Fifteenth Amendment was drafted, the language “appropriate 
legislation” could be found in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment67 
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.68  Ratification of those 
amendments occurred years before ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, and so legislation or judicial decisions that surrounded enforcement 
legislation of the first Reconstruction Amendments colored the understand-
ing of “appropriate legislation” here. 
Unfortunately for the purpose of context, Congress did not pass a swath 
of legislation following the ratification of these Amendments.  Indeed, 
Congress passed only one major bill following each:  The Freedman’s Bu-
reau Act of 1865 and The Civil Rights Act of 1866.  While these bills cer-
tainly show that Congress, the Court, and the Nation were not of one mind 
regarding the extent of “appropriate legislation,” neither directly dealt with 
the idea of state equal sovereignty.  The Freedman’s Bureau “empowered 
bureau agents both to assume jurisdiction of cases involving blacks and to 
punish state officials who denied the civil rights white persons pos-
sessed.”69  The Civil Rights Act guaranteed the rights of all citizens regard-
less of race and color and equal protection under the law.70  It also empow-
ered federal agents to prosecute violations of the law in federal court, 
including violations under state law.71 
Both laws created federal supremacy when enforcing laws relating 
these amendments in the states, and both laws used the courts as their pri-
mary vehicle for doing so.  Both laws were also ultimately abandoned, ei-
ther due to intense political opposition or by decree of the Supreme Court.  
However, these short-lived laws do not provide significant insight into the 
understanding of what “appropriate legislation” could mean in this context 
because neither act applied different standards to different states.  From the 
contextual usage of “appropriate legislation” alone, we can garner no clear 
understanding of whether Congress, or the nation as a whole, contemplated 
an abrogation of state equal sovereignty. 
Next, we turn to Justice Ginsburg’s precedential argument in Shelby 
County, which also attempts to provide evidence of the phrase’s contextual 
meaning.  Her dissent argued that the specific language of “appropriate leg-
 
 67 U.S. CONST., amend. XIII, § 2. 
 68 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 5. 
 69 Frank J. Scaturro, THE SUPREME COURT’S RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION 8 (Greenwood 
Press, eds. 2000). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
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islation” meant that the Framers of the Fifteenth Amendment intended to 
incorporate the scope of congressional power under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, as described in McCulloch v. Maryland.72  While Framer 
intent does not equate to contextual meaning, Justice Ginsburg argued that 
McCulloch’s language can provide color to the word as it is used in the Fif-
teenth Amendment. 
The dissent quoted portions of McCulloch that describe congressional 
authority and paralleled the use of “appropriate” as it is used to delineate 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause with the enforcement provi-
sion of the Fifteenth Amendment.  In McCulloch, Justice Marshall writes:  
“let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and 
all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, 
which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution.”73  The dissent then uses this language to argue that “[i]t cannot ten-
ably be maintained that the [Voting Rights Act], an Act of Congress adopt-
ed to shield the right to vote from racial discrimination, is inconsistent with 
the letter or spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment.”74  Because the Framers of 
the Fifteenth Amendment were aware of McCulloch during the ratification 
of all the Reconstruction Amendments, Justice Ginsburg argues, the specif-
ic phrasing of Justice Marshall’s famous quote is more likely to have been 
the original source of this language not previously used in the Constitution. 
The dissent further argues that the word “appropriate” implied statutes 
that were “consistent with the letter and spirit of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment.”  From this, Justice Ginsburg concluded that the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s “transformative” effect on congressional powers “to enact ‘appro-
priate’ legislation targeting state abuses” allows § 4(b) to continue to be an 
appropriate use of legislation.75 
However, while this precedential argument could strengthen the argu-
ment for the constitutionality of § 4(b), the totality of the evidence sur-
rounding the provision’s constitutional context is, at best, inconclusive be-
cause McCulloch did not deal with the issue of state equal sovereignty.  In 
her dissent, Justice Ginsburg took the vague understanding from McCul-
loch and used other tools of construction to properly apply McCulloch’s 
understanding to the issue in Shelby County.  Her conclusion is not based 
solely upon the semantic and communicative content of the text, and so it is 
 
 72 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2636-38 (2013) (discussing scope of Necessary 
Proper Clause). 
 73 Id. at 2637 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819)).  It should also be noted that 
McCulloch, decided several decades prior, can be viewed as either (1) canonical law which all 
lawyers at the time would be aware of, or (2) a decades-old case not considered in the fall-out of 
the most devastating war on U.S. soil.  Both are reasonable arguments and increase the ambiguity 
and uncertainty of its application to the Fifteenth Amendment. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
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still acceptable for Justice Roberts to assert that abrogating state equal sov-
ereignty is not an appropriate method to effectuate the right of individuals 
to vote regardless of race or class.  Justice Ginsburg’s argument, while 
well-reasoned, cannot militate against Justice Roberts’ reasoning because it 
is not wholly based upon a constraining principle in the interpretation 
phase.  Without contemporary legislation or judicial decisions that deal 
specifically with the states’ equal sovereignty, we cannot be sure of the Fif-
teenth Amendment framers’ intent for “appropriate.” 
b.  Congressional and State Sentiment Regarding Section 2 
While the communicative content can garner no constraining principle, 
a judge still has other avenues to explore before determining a text to be 
irreducibly vague.  For many contemporary originalists, any legitimate 
constraining principle would require that § 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act be 
determined constitutional because the original public meaning of “appro-
priate legislation” was understood to empower Congress to enact laws that 
are reasonably necessary to promote substantively equal rights.  Of course, 
this is a difficult task, and often the only available documentation that illus-
trates the understanding of legislation is through the perspective of the leg-
islators themselves.  However, while these documents are an imperfect 
standard upon which to base the public’s ultimate understanding of the text, 
they can be a good starting point. 
It is difficult to discern which contemporary statements accurately por-
tray the polity’s understanding of a specific piece of legislation, as no one 
statement can encapsulate the diverse opinions of the entire nation.  We can 
hope, however, that statements made by political actors on the House and 
Senate floors are at least somewhat representative of a general sentiment, 
as those actors are held accountable by their constituents.  Congressional 
session documents during the Amendment’s ratification seem to imply that 
there was consensus among supporters and detractors that the Appropriate 
Legislation Clause would revolutionize the balance between state and fed-
eral sovereignty in the context of election law,76 but there is no clear con-
sensus about what form that revolution would take. 
There is some contemporary evidence of legislators’ understandings of 
“appropriate legislation” as it pertained to the Fifteenth Amendment.  For 
example, in May 1870, the House considered a bill entitled “An act to en-
force the rights of citizens to vote in the United States and the several 
 
 76 See generally John Mabry Matthews, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 20-37 (2001) (discussing the formation of the Amendment and its improvements 
upon past legislative failures to impose federal guidelines upon individual states). 
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States of this Union, and for other purposes.”77  The Act reaffirmed the 
right to vote granted by Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment, banned vot-
ing prerequisites enacted by states, and created punishments for official and 
other persons who tried to limit a person’s right to vote through threats or 
intimidation.78  During the session, Representative John Stiles (PA) and 
Michael Kerr (IN), who opposed the Act, contended that all but the first 
portion of the bill, which reaffirmed the rights of all individuals to vote, 
was unconstitutional.79  In response, Representative Noah Davis of New 
York, one of the Act’s supporters, responded with an argument similar to 
Justice Ginsburg’s argument in Shelby County: 
“Appropriate” means that which is necessary and proper to accomplish the end. 
Congress, then, is clothed with so much power as is necessary and proper to en-
force the two amendments80 to the Constitution, and is to judge from the exi-
gencies of the case what is necessary and proper.81 
From this, Representative Davis argued that the entire Act was constitu-
tional.  With this understanding, the bill passed with a majority vote. 
Of course, these statements alone cannot show either general legislative 
intent or public meaning.  Representatives Johnson and Kerr could not have 
believed that “appropriate legislation” granted all powers “necessary and 
proper to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment” if they rejected the bill for be-
ing unconstitutional.  Indeed, Representative Davis made his remarks in re-
sponse to Representative Johnson, who asserted before the House that 
while the Fifteenth Amendment was the supreme law of the land, the Act 
itself was an unconstitutional and “fatal blow at State rights.”82  They could 
not have believed that the Fifteenth Amendment’s “appropriate legislation” 
clause granted necessary and proper powers to abridge state sovereignty if 
they simultaneously (1) rejected the bill as unconstitutional but (2) accept-
ed the legitimacy of the Amendment upon which the bill stood. 
Beyond this, there is conflicting evidence regarding the autonomy of 
the branches to determine what constitutes “appropriate legislation.”  For 
example, Republican Representative Jeremiah Wilson of Indiana discussed 
the understanding of “appropriate legislation” before the Congress in April 
1871, after the Fifteenth Amendment had been ratified.  He argued, “Con-
 
 77 Enforcement Act of 1870, c. 114, 16 Stat. 141.  The bill’s name was referenced in the Congres-
sional Debate of Representative Stiles of Pennsylvania, Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2nd sess., p. 
3881. 
 78 Id. 
 79 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3877, 3880-81 (1870).  In his speech, Rep. Davis references 
Rep. Michael Kerr (IN) as ultimately finding the bill unconstitutional.  However, Rep. Davis had 
yielded his time to Rep. Johnson, who made the statements referenced above. 
 80 Here, Rep. Davis is referring to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment, which are the enforcement provisions of both. 
 81 CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong. 2nd Sess. 3882 (1870). 
 82 Stiles of Pennsylvania, Cong. Record, 42nd Cong., 2nd sess., p. 3881. 
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gress is not only the exclusive judge of necessity for the application of 
remedies, but also the exclusive judge of what the remedies shall be.”83  
This statement implies that the Amendment empowered Congress to de-
termine the extent to which the Tenth Amendment would be abrogated, 
which could make Justice Roberts’ argument unfounded. 
However, we can also see from the full context of Representative Wil-
son’s remarks that his interpretation was vehemently opposed.  Senator 
William Hamilton of Maryland, for example, was among a group of strict 
constructionists who believed that Section 2 conferred Congress with no 
affirmative power of legislation, but rather empowered the courts to en-
force the Constitution.84  In fact, Senator Hamilton goes on to assert than 
any such legislation by Congress would be immediately declared unconsti-
tutional by the Courts,85 directly contradicting Representative Wilson’s im-
plied assertion. 
Other early attempts to give universal suffrage to African American 
voters during the Reconstruction Era were also hotly contested in both 
Northern and Southern states.  The Amendment, which was first presented 
in late 1866, was feared to abridge state sovereignty of loyal states86 as well 
as to subject Southern states to intense federal control.87  Many statements 
by congressional representatives at the time that expressly stated that Sec-
 
 83 Wilson of Indiana, Cong. Record, 42d Cong., 1st sess., p. 482 -83. 
WILSON: And now sir, who is to judge as to the necessity for congressional interven-
tion?  Congress must be the exclusive judge.  It is for Congress to look to the question 
whether or not the State affords that protection the Constitution requires, and if it does 
not, then to provide the proper remedies. And under this section Congress is not only the 
exclusive judge of the necessity for the application of remedies, but is also the exclusive 
judge of what the remedies shall be . . . .  What is “appropriate legislation?” It is legisla-
tion adequate to meet the difficulties to be encountered, to suppress the wrongs existing, 
to furnish remedies and [to] inflict penalties adequate to the suppression of all infractions 
of the rights of citizens.  And of what is necessary to this end Congress alone must be the 
judge . . . . 
This portion of the Representative’s speech, discussing “House Bill 320 – to enforce the provisions of 
the fourteenth amendment,” offers a unique insight into the Congressional understanding of “ap-
propriate legislation” because it directly discusses the judicial discretion/ judicial supremacy di-
vide. Representative Wilson’s remarks are in response to the “gentleman from Kentucky” (Rep-
resentative James Beck) who had previously asserted that section 4 of the fourteenth amendment 
– which is identical to section 2 of the fifteenth amendment – allowed only for remedy in Court. 
 84 See Matthews, supra note 76 (describing the general understanding of the enforcement legisla-
tion that Congress believed it had under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 85 Hamilton of Maryland, Globe, 41st Cong., 2d sess., Appendix, p. 354.  In full, he states: 
The amendment is negative upon the power of Congress and is complete in itself.  The 
exercise of any such power thus prohibited by congressional legislation is simply uncon-
stitutional and void, and would be so declared by the appropriate tribunals upon appeal 
by the aggrieved to them. 
 86 See Matthews, supra note 76, at 12-13.  Northern states recognized that a form of abrogation of 
state autonomy would necessarily take place when passing a law requiring suffrage, and there-
fore resisted any bills targeted at any state.  The states that resisted surrendering power included 
New York, Connecticut, Ohio, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Kansas.  Id. at 13. 
 87 See generally Id. at 20-37 (discussing the general formation of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
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tion 2 required substantial congressional interference to enforce the primary 
provision of the Fifteenth Amendment were vehemently opposed.88 
For example, Senator Doolittle of Wisconsin, a visceral opponent of the 
Amendment, believed that it would allow Congress to “appoint judges at 
the election-polls; to send officers to attend the elections to secure order; to 
count the votes and secure the votes of colored men in determining the re-
sult-in short, to control the elections.”89  Senator Doolittle also discussed 
how even the Amendment’s proponents recognized that it would abrogate 
state sovereignty.90  The Hon. H. Wilson, a supporter of the Amendment, 
conceded as much in his impassioned speech before the Assembly in rebut-
tal to Congressman Doolittle’s speech.91 
Not all contemporary voices believed that Section 2 would abrogate 
state sovereignty, however.  In fact, many contemporaries understood Sec-
tion 2 to be a merely declaratory resolution whose power could not be 
wielded in reality.92  These critics maintained that, like Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, implementing any such legislation would be both 
inefficient and difficult to execute.93  Other congressional representatives 
similarly thought that Section 2 would remain dormant only until a particu-
lar state or collection of states refused to enact appropriate legislation on its 
own, thus conferring a type of concurrent authority between the Congress 
and the States.94 
State political figures appeared no more united on the effect of the Fif-
teenth Amendment than did their federal counterparts.  Many states ratified 
 
 88 See Id. at 48 (discussing the particular manner in which Congress debated taking control of the 
vote). 
 89 Doolittle of Wisconsin, Globe, 40th Cong., 3d sess., Appendix, at 151.  See also Matthews, supra 
note 76 at 49 (“Under it Congress might send ‘satraps’ into every election district in the country, 
and relieve the States from all further attention to the subject.”). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Hon. H. Wilson, Globe, 40th Cong., 3d ses., Appendix at 154. The relevant portions of the 
speech are as follows. 
“[The Honorable Senators] tell us we were pledged by our national convention of 1868; 
that we were committed to the doctrine that the right to regulate the suffrage properly be-
longed to the loyal States.  So the earlier Republican national conventions proclaimed 
that slavery in the States was a local institution, for which the people of each State only 
were responsible.  But that declaration did not stand in the way of the proclamation did 
not stand in the way of the proclamation of emancipation, did not stand in the way of the 
thirteenth article of the amendments of the Constitution . . . The declaration that the suf-
frage in the loyal States properly belonged to the people of those States meant this, no 
more, no less:  that under the Constitution it belonged to the people of each of the loyal 
States to regulate suffrage therein.” (emphasis added). 
This final sentence directly implies that the States were never the sole proprietors of election admin-
istration, but rather the people who were eligible to participate in the vote.  This statement can be 
interpreted to either abrogate state sovereignty through the ratification of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment or suggest that States were never endowed with such sovereignty. 
 92 See Matthews, supra note 76, at 49. 
 93 See id. 
 94 Axtell of California, Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 258. 
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the Amendment without incident,95 which gives little indication as to 
whether those state legislators agreed with their colleagues in Congress 
about the Amendment’s effects.  Florida and Michigan, however, provide 
some insight into the view of Amendment-friendly states.  For example, the 
Florida governor championed the resolution as a homogenization of the 
states.  From this, one could argue that state equal sovereignty was left in-
tact, especially when one recognizes that while some states would be more 
affected than others during the transition, no individual state was held to a 
different standard than any other state. 
However, the Florida Assembly minority party raised the familiar ad-
verse argument that “suffrage was properly a local matter, to be regulated 
by each State for itself,” and that the Constitution did not justify “one or 
many states from prescribing suffrage regulations for another.”96  Similarly, 
the Committee on Federal Relations in the Michigan House issued a report, 
stating that “[t]he proposed Amendment is an encroachment upon the rights 
of the States . . . and tends to weaken and destroy the checks and balances 
wisely framed by the fathers of the Republic.”97  These remarks from the 
Amendment’s detractors could be seen as evidence that the Amendment 
was indeed believed to abrogate states’ equal sovereignty. 
The mixed messages issued by members of opposite parties make it im-
possible to determine the final consensus of the Amendment, if one ever 
existed.  What we know is that the Amendment passed the House and the 
Senate with a two-thirds majority in the House and the Senate in February 
186998 and was ratified by three-fourths of the states in February 1870. 99 
This does not mean, however, that the debates created an understanding 
amongst the polity that the Amendment abrogated state equal sovereignty, 
or that it was passed over the objections of the minority.  It could mean that 
the majority, recognizing that the vote and ratification would be incredibly 
close, conceded the idea of abrogation to secure ratification.  What is more 
likely, however, is that the idea of state equal sovereignty was not consid-
ered by either the Framers or the ratifying states.  In either event, we cannot 
know from the constitutional context, legislation, or the debates them-
selves. There is simply no consensus from the legislators to make an ade-
quate determination of what was considered “appropriate.” 
There are many similar floor debates surrounding the understanding of 
“appropriate.” This cycle of investigation and comparison could continue 
 
 95 See Matthews, supra note 76, at 58-62. 
 96 See Id. at 64. 
 97 See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 58. 
 98 African Americans and the Fifteenth Amendment, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, 
available at http://www.crf-usa.org/black-history-month/african-americans-and-the-15th-
amendment. [hereinafter “African Americans”]. 
 99 See id. 
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for much longer than this comment will allow, and the results would likely 
resemble the parry and riposte that is seen above.  A legal rule cannot be 
created solely from the communicative content of these discussions. 
c.  Contemporary Legislation 
Clearly, no consensus existed on the congressional floor concerning the 
parameters of Section 2 such that one can discern a constraining principle.  
As a final avenue of investigation, one must look to contemporary legisla-
tion that was proposed and passed under the Fifteenth Amendment to en-
force the provisions of Section 1. 
As previously discussed, the only contemporary law designed specifi-
cally to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment was the Enforcement Act of 
1870. 100  While floor debates proved unhelpful, this section looks to the 
effects of the legislation on states’ obligations.  This bill was relatively 
tame in comparison to the grand rhetoric of the Republican Party, as it did 
not infringe upon the States’ ability to regulate their own elections.101  To 
be sure, the bill was decried on both sides as either a usurpation of Con-
gressional authority or “an excellent recipe for pretending to do something 
without accomplishing anything.”102  However, as the bill was the single 
contemporary bill to reach beyond the congressional floor into the Presi-
dent’s office for signing, it is strong evidence that this bill was the congres-
sional consensus on the extent of “appropriate legislation.”  While the Act 
brought all states under the enforcement of the federal government, it did 
so equally to each.  From the bill’s language, it appears that Congress did 
not intend to abrogate state equal sovereignty. 
It is also worth noting that a preliminary bill came before the House 
floor that could not be passed.  H.R. 1815, a precursor to the Enforcement 
Act, was brought before the House of Representatives on April 18, 1870.103 
The bill reiterated the first section of the Fifteenth Amendment, assessed 
potential fines and imprisonment of state officials who contravened the bill, 
afforded methods of recourse for false claims, and granted a private right of 
action for persons deprived of their office under the Act.104  Generally, the 
text of the bill gave Courts the power to adjudicate any voting deprivations, 
after the fact, while withholding executive authority to take affirmative 
 
100 See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 79. 
101 See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 79-81. The bill as a whole made a declaratory statement that 
reiterated the goals of the Fifteenth Amendment’s first section, levied fines and imprisonment 
upon public officials who denied or abridged the right to vote, banned the use of discrimination 
by the assessors of taxes in states where such measures are used to enfranchise citizens, and 
banned judges or inspectors of elections from doing the same. Id. 
102 See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 81. 
103 H.R. 1815, 41st Cong., 2d. sess., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875. 
104 See id. 
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acts.  This original language also strongly favors an argument that the Fif-
teenth Amendment was never intended to abrogate state equal sovereignty. 
The Senate’s sister bill provides more insight and adds credence to this 
view. The Senate Judiciary Committee rejected the House Bill in its entire-
ty, and proposed legislation that would reach all methods of white interfer-
ence with the minority, including more invasive restrictions by Congress.105 
This re-writing, and subsequent failure of the new bill, could imply a gen-
eral consensus that greater invasions upon states’ ability to regulate them-
selves were not “appropriate” to secure voting rights. 
Beyond specific enforcement, Congress also enacted H.R. 1305, which 
was entitled “a bill to remove political disabilities in States ratifying and 
conforming their constitutions and laws to the provisions of the Fifteenth 
Amendment . . . .”106  As its title suggests, the bill allowed states that rati-
fied the Fifteenth Amendment to be removed from their reconstruction dis-
abilities under the Fourteenth Amendment.107  This ratification prerequisite 
could be seen as an abrogation of equal sovereignty.  However, it could al-
so be argued that the southern states were no longer functioning in their ca-
pacities as “states” during this reconstruction period.108  On the other hand, 
the bill’s text explicitly mentions “the legislature of any State of the United 
States,” rather than as a territory.  The southern states that had been read-
mitted to the Union were given varying degrees of sovereignty regarding 
their right to hold office in Congress.  Because this bill regarding ac-
ceptance of the Fifteenth Amendment codified the acceptability of this dis-
parate treatment, it could be argued that there was a general understanding 
that Congress already had the ability to abrogate equal sovereignty in the 
voting context. 
Of course, approximately a quarter of the states were in no position to 
vote on the bill, as their admittance back into Congress had not yet taken 
place.  Moreover, this bill was not specifically enacted through the “appro-
 
105 See MATTHEWS, supra note 76 at 82-83. 
106 H.R. 1305, 41st Cong., 2d sess., U.S. CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DEBATES, 1774-1875. 
107 Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and 
Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any 
State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of 
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disabil-
ity. U.S. Const. am. XIV. 
108 The former Confederate States were readmitted to the Union from 1865-1870, with Georgia be-
ing the final state to rejoin in July 1870.  Several states – including South Carolina, Florida, 
Georgia, Mississippi, Arkansas, North Carolina, and Tennessee – had been readmitted when this 
bill was proposed to the House in February 1870. See Reconstruction: The Second Civil War, 
pbs.org, available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/reconstruction /states/sf_timeline2.html 
(outlining the timeline of Reconstruction in America from 1861-1877). 
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priate legislation” provision of the Fifteenth Amendment at all, but rather 
through both the Fifteenth Amendment and Congress’ Article IV powers.109 
In light of this, using this bill to prove that Section 2 was understood to ab-
rogate equal sovereignty becomes tenuous.  Contemporary congressional 
legislation, it appears, was not actively concerned with the idea of equal 
sovereignty, and so a restraining principle remains elusive. 
As it remains unclear whether abrogation of state equal sovereignty is 
“appropriate legislation” to guarantee the voting rights of citizens, there is 
no way to eradicate the vagueness of the phrase in such a way that a con-
straining principle can be created and applied to the facts of Shelby County.  
The original understanding of “appropriate legislation,” while constraining 
any final legal rule, is sufficiently vague to warrant further constitutional 
construction for a judge deciding this case. 
B.  Constitutional Construction and Original Utility 
The search to find a constraining principle in the communicative con-
tent of the phrase “appropriate legislation” has failed.  Armed with the 
vague and loosely constraining framework that Congress may enforce the 
Amendment by the most suitable, fit, or proper legislation, any judge 
would now be required to construct, not interpret, an actual rule from 
which to decide this case.  To do so, he or she has the ability to select a 
normative theory of construction. 
As discussed in Section IA, the selection of a normative theory would 
not conflict with the rules of fixation and restraint if the text is sufficiently 
vague.  Thus, neither Justices Roberts’ nor Justice Ginsburg’s interpretive 
approaches in Shelby County contravene originalist doctrine, as neither the 
majority nor the dissent argued that the words “appropriate legislation” de-
finitively precluded or militated a certain conclusion.  Rather, Justice Gins-
burg argued that in the presence of a vague proposition, the Court should 
defer to Congress110 and Justice Roberts instead championed the continued 
importance of state equal sovereignty.111 
Both approaches are normative theories of constitutional construction. 
Justice Ginsburg employed a Thayerian constitutional deference ap-
 
109 U.S. Const., art. IV, § 3. Under Section 3, “The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and 
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to 
the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any 
Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”  Id. 
110 See Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2637-38 (2013) (Ginsurg, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that in cases involving “appropriate legislation” enacted by Congress to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment, the Court should defer to Congressional findings). 
111 See id. at 2644 (describing Chief Justice Roberts’ explanation of how equal sovereignty can only 
be abrogated in specific circumstances). 
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proach112 and Justice Roberts employed a theory that gave deference to 
federalism and states’ equal sovereignty.113  Both justices interpreted the 
text in a way that did not contradict the natural or reasonable meaning of 
the language, which is as far as constitutional interpretation purports to go, 
whether the understanding of “original interpretation” is from Justice Scalia 
or Professor Solum.  It seems, then, that originalism leaves the work only 
half finished. 
It is the responsibility of judges and justices to not only determine what 
text means, but to decide cases.  There must be a process by which the 
text’s communicative content is applied to the facts of the case.  While Jus-
tice Scalia argued in Reading Law that the Fair Readings Method continues 
this process without allowing judges to stray into their own predilections,114 
this textual interpretation is no longer originalism, but rather another nor-
mative theory of construction. 
While both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Ginsburg – admittedly in 
deed more than word – adhered to the originalist tenets of fixation and con-
straint, the reasonable meaning of “appropriate language” was ultimately 
irreducibly vague and unhelpful as a constraining principle.  The two jus-
tices then reached opposing positions, which can always result when inter-
preting intentionally vague propositions. 
The term “appropriate legislation” is vague and was likely intended to 
be so.  Constitutional provisions are added only after intense debate and na-
tionwide political upset.  Political parties, and personal opinions, are likely 
to be disparate.  In order to come to some form of consensus, constitutional 
language that goes beyond a discrete, specific rule must be vague in order 
to accommodate and overshadow the ultimate lack of consensus by the pol-
ity.  This vagueness precludes the opportunity for most constitutional deci-
sions to rely solely on the text of the document.  Other forms of constitu-
tional interpretation are required in order to create an actual rule and 
holding for a particular case.  However, if other normative forms of consti-
tutional decision-making are required to reach an ultimate adjudication, 
then originalism neither constrains judges nor facilitates a definitive con-
clusion of what the law is. 
Unfortunately for originalists who uphold the tenets of judicial con-
straint and fidelity to the law, construction opens the door to judicial discre-
 
112 For a greater explanation of Thayerianism, see James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the 
American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 140-44 (1893). See also Solum, 
supra note 6 at 516-17 (describing, in greater detail, the modern version of Thayerian constitu-
tional deference). 
113 This is also known as the federalism canon, which instructs that ambiguities in federal statutes 
should be construed not to interfere with traditional state functions.  Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal 
Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 755 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
753, 763 (2013). 
114 See notes 33-45, supra, and accompanying text. 
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tion almost as much as if an investigation of the original meaning had never 
been done.  Whether a judge follows Justice Scalia’s Fair Reading Method, 
Justice Ginsburg’s congressional deference approach, or another theory of 
constitutional interpretation, the judge will be choosing between one or an-
other normative interpretive theory. 
If this is true, then perhaps it is strange that originalism is so champi-
oned.  It does not appear to bring us closer to a definitive answer of the law 
in situations where it would be most needed.  Shelby County is just one ex-
ample of the result of a probing analysis into the original public meaning of 
a constitutional phrase, which produced, at best, a nominally constraining 
principle.  Perhaps this means that originalism cannot constrain judges.  
Constitutional construction requires normative, subjective theories.  Even if 
a judge looked first at the original public meaning of a text, she could still 
choose between several normative theories that will get her to the conclu-
sion that she finds most desirable.  The problem with a judge cloaking her-
self in “originalism” is that she can then argue that she is being entirely ra-
tional and disinterested, when in fact she is deciding cases that best fit with 
her ideological views. 
Why, then, should we require judges first to look to the consensus of 
the polity in the late 1860s when no true consensus can be found?  In light 
of the philosophy’s ineffectiveness, the exercise begins to look like an ap-
peal to our storied forefathers to reach a desired outcome.  If we must ap-
peal to the understanding of a particular divided group, why not look to the 
understanding of those currently alive?  Current citizens have an under-
standing of what those words mean in our contemporary context that more 
readily applies to any facts with which a judge will be presented.  Perhaps 
their understanding should bear more weight, if no prior consensus can ev-
er be found. 
CONCLUSION 
In many situations, of which Shelby County is one, originalism neither 
constrains judges nor discovers the law, and so perhaps academic scholar-
ship should stop pretending that it does.  Professor Solum has presented a 
theory distinguishing between constitutional interpretation and constitu-
tional construction during judicial decision-making, and general original-
ism philosophy falls squarely within the constitutional interpretation step.  
While the theory can be a helpful starting point in this role, it often ulti-
mately fails to live up to its espoused tenets of judicial constraint and fideli-
ty to the law.  This comment provided a hypothetical study into the ulti-
mate decisions of the Shelby County v. Holder decision to examine one 
instance of this.  The Appropriate Legislation Clause is sufficiently vague 
that it is possible for two judges following the tenets of fixation and con-
straint to still construct two diametrically opposed holdings because a thor-
Apr. 2016] ORIGINALISM AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 27 
ough and probing view into the original public meaning provided an am-
biguous definition of the word “appropriate” and no truly constraining 
principle could be found.  In light of this, originalism seems to lose its im-
port.  If the philosophy cannot deliver on its two most important tenets, 
then perhaps we should stop elevating it as the philosophy of the rational 
and impartial judge. 
